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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
be protected and the court would not have to require a perma-
nent attachment under Article 467 before holding that the mov-
able became immobilized. These other forms of protection will
be available whether the movable was attached permanently or:
not, whereas it is surmised that if the attachment were perma-
nent the vendor would lose his right under the current interpre-
tation of Article 467.
The policy considerations which prompted the amendment to
Article 467 are not questioned by the writer. However, the
method used to effectuate this policy is disturbing in certain par-
ticulars. The "unity of ownership" concept was peculiar to im-
movables by destination prior to the 1912 amendment. The Lou-
isiana Civil Code was written and enacted as a unified body of
law. This coherence has been disrupted by the amendment to
Article 467 by requiring "unity of ownership" in the classifica-
tion of things as immovable by their nature. It is suggested that
the policy objectives which prompted the amendment could as
easily have been accomplished through an addition to the Revised
Statutes without disrupting the unity of the Civil Code.
Gordon A. Pugh
The Doctor - Patient Privilege in Civil Cases in
Louisiana
Generally all evidence relevant to the issues at trial is ad-
missible, although of course there are many exceptions. The
physician-patient privilege is designed as an exception to this
rule in that it works an exclusion of otherwise admissible evi-
dence. It is designed to encourage the free exchange of infor-
mation between physicians and their patients. The desirability
of the privilege is essentially tested by the balancing of a revela-
tion of truth on the one hand and the encouragement of dis-
closure'to physicians on the other. Although the physician-pa-
tient privilege did not exist at common law,' various states have
adopted it by statute.2 Louisiana has provided for the privilege
1. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (3d ed. 1940) and authorities cited therein;
3 JONES, EVIDENCE § 838 (5th ed. 1958) ; MCCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 101 (1954).
England still does not recognize the privilege.
2. See note 1 8upra. For a detailed compilation of the statutes adopted; see
8 WrGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (3d ed. 1940).
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in criminal proceedings by a provision in the Code of Criminal
Procedure.3 There is no specific legislation dealing with the
privilege in civil cases. It is the purpose of this Comment to
investigate whether the physician-patient privilege exists in
Louisiana civil cases.
Statutory Law
Since there is no express legislation on the existence of the
privilege in civil litigation, a determination of the existence of
such a privilege necessitates investigation of other possible
sources. In this connection, a brief look at the sources of Lou-
isiana rules of evidence may prove helpful. In 1805, the Crimes
Act4 was adopted, providing for the application of common law
rules of evidence in administration of cases falling under its
provisions. Then, in Durnford v. Clark,5 a civil case, the Lou-
isiana court considered a rule of common law evidence in reach-
ing its decision. Later, in Planters' Bank v. George6 it was held
that the common law rules of evidence were in force in Louisi-
ana civil cases. Since the privilege does not exist at common
law, it would appear that an application of common law rules
of evidence provides no basis for the existence of the privilege
in Louisiana civil cases.
All Louisiana Constitutions since 1879 have contained pro-
visions for the physician-patient privilege. 7 However, since
3. LA. R.S. 15:476 (1950) : "No physician is permitted, whether -during or
after the termination of his employment as such, unless with his patient's express
consent, to disclose any communication made to him as such physician by or on
behalf of his patient, or the result of any investigation made into the patient's
physical or mental condition, or any opinion based upon such investigation, or any
information that he may have gotten by reason of his being such physician; pro-
vided, that the provisions of this article shall not apply to any physician, who,
under the appointment of the court, and not by a selection of the patient, has
made investigation into the patient's physical or mental condition ; provided, fur-
ther, that any physician may be cross-examined upon the correctness of any
certificate issued by him." For the waiver provision, see id. 15:478.
4. La. Acts 1804, c. 50, p. 416, adopted May 4, 1805. See specifically id. §
33, at 440, providing for application of common law rules of evidence in admin-
istration of cases under the act. In the same year, the Practice Act was adopted.
While that act did provide for some evidentiary rules, there was no provision for
the general rules of evidence in cases under the act. La. Acts 1804, c. 26, p. 210,
adopted April 10, 1805.
5. Durnford v. Clark, 1 Mart.(O.S.) 202 (La. 1811) (applied common law
rule allowing witness to be cross-examined only on points which were adduced
on direct examination).
6. 6 Mart.(O.S.) 670 (La. 1819).
7. LA. CONST. art. 178 (1879) ; LA. CONST. art. 297 (1898) ; LA. CONST. art.
297 (1913) ; LA. CONST. art. VI, § 12 (1921). The present Constitution provides:
"The Legislature shall provide for the interest of State Medicine in all its
departments . . . for protecting confidential communications made to practitioners
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the provision of the present Constitution has been said not to be
self-operative, no privilege may be drawn from that source
alone. As mentioned above, the Code of Criminal Procedure
provides for the physician-patient privilege in criminal cases.'
The problem of whether or not the privilege conferred by the
Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable in civil cases was dis-
cussed by the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in Rhodes v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 10 In that case the beneficiary
under a life insurance policy sought recovery for the death of
the insured. In answer to the defendant's contention that the
insured had made misleading statements to the doctor as to his
physical condition without which statements he could not have
purchased insurance, the plaintiff claimed the statements were
privileged. In an alternative holding the court said that "the
privilege in question is restricted to criminal proceedings.""
After apparently resolving that point, the court went on to hold
that even if this position was not sound, the privilege was per-
sonal to the patient and could not be claimed by the beneficiary
of the insured's insurance policy. This latter statement appears
to have weakened the former. No case has been found in which
a Louisiana appellate court directly resolved the issue of the
applicability of the privilege provisions in the Code of Criminal
Procedure in civil litigation. The position has been taken that
those provisions are legislative mandates on the proper rules of
evidence for Louisiana courts, and that as they are fairly com-
plete they should be followed in civil cases in preference to the
common law.' 2 On the other hand, it is said that the legislature
enacted the Code of Criminal Procedure when those interested
were aware that the common law rules of evidence were being
applied in civil cases, and that if a change was desired legisla-
of medicine and dentistry and druggist by their patients and clients while under
professional treatment and for the purpose of such treatment."
8. State v. Genna, 163 La. 701, 112 So. 655 (1927) (not self-operative in
connection with public and private doctors; case calls for legislative implementa-
tion if privilege desired).
9. For criminal cases dealing with doctor-patient communications prior to the
adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure (La. Acts 1928, No. 2) see State v.
Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890 (1904) (visit upon which statements were made
was not visit for treatment and a doctor-patient relationship held not to come
into existence) ; State v. McCoy, 109 La. 682, 33 So. 730 (1903) (evidence ad-
mitted, not on basis of lack of privilege but on a technicality). The court in
each case based its decision on technicalities rather than a flat holding of no
privilege. .
10. 172 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1949).
11. Id. at 184.
12. See generally Comment, 14 LOuISiANA LAW REviEw 568, 577 (1944).
[Vol. XX
COMMENTS
tion could have been provided. 8 There is no definite indication
of whether or not the Louisiana courts will follow the Rhodes
decision and thereby declare that no privilege exists in civil
cases.
There are other statutory provisions which may have some
pertinence to the problem. The Louisiana legislature has enacted
statutes aimed at securing the availability of charity hospital
records as evidence.14 In Shepard v. Whitney National Bank15
a statement was made to an interne in Charity Hospital in New
Orleans and signed by the patient. The interne incorporated the
statement into the patient's record. When plaintiff tried to ex:
elude the record on the basis of the physician-patient privilege,
the court overruled his objection saying: "There does not appear
to be any reason why the records . . .should not be offered in
evidence."' 16 It appears to the writer that there was no inten-
tion on the part of the legislature to effect any change in the
law relative to the physician-patient privilege by enacting the
Hospital Records Statutes. The statutes appear to have been
meant to remove only the hearsay objection to the introduction
of these records. It is submitted that the statutes should have
no bearing on the physician-patient privilege in civil cases.
Under the provisions of Revised Statutes 40:978, communica-
tions made to a physician for the purpose of unlawfully obtain-
ing drugs or narcotics or the administration thereof are not
privileged.' 7 There have been no reported cases under its pro-
visions. Several questions are presented by the statute. If the
statute was intended solely as an exception to the privilege in
criminal cases, with no bearing on civil matters, it would seem
that it would have been enacted as an amendment to the Code
of Criminal Procedure. There would of course be no necessity
for such a provision regarding civil cases, if there is in fact no
such privilege there. But it must be remembered that there is
generally no privilege in the absence of a statute conferring one.
There appears to be little basis for contending by negative im-
plication that R.S. 40:978 has brought a physician-patient privi-
lege into our civil rules of evidence.
13. Ibid.
14. LA. R.S. 13:3714, as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 519, § 1 (Supp. 1958)
(charity hospitals and veteran hospitals) ; id. 13:3715 (charity hospitals).
15. 177 So. 825 (La. App. 1938).
16. Id. at 826.
17. LA. R.S. 40:978(B) (1950) (information communicated to a physician
in an effort unlawfully to procure a narcotic drug, or unlawful to procure the
administration of any such drug, shall not be deemed a privileged communication).
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On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it would appear
that the physician-patient privilege is not a part of the civil
rules of evidence by virtue of any legislation on the subject.
Case Law
In Morgan v. American Bitumuls Co.18 the plaintiff, seeking
workmen's compensation, claimed a physician-patient privilege
when four doctors who had examined him were called by the
defendant. The trial court sustained plaintiff's claim of privi-
lege. The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, reversed this holding
saying: "There is no basis for sustaining of this objection in a
compensation case." 19 Under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
rules of evidence are to be liberally construed.20 In workmen's
compensation cases the plaintiff is putting his physical condi-
tion at issue, and it would seem that he should not be allowed
to deny the court an opportunity to hear all possible testimony
as regards that physical condition. It might be contended that
the narrow language of the court restricting its holding to a
"!compensation case" should be construed as a negative implica-
tion that the privilege exists in other civil cases. It is the opinion
of the writer that this contention is without any substantial
basis.
Under the doctrine of the adverse presumption, as developed
by the jurisprudence, the failure of one of the parties to call on
all of the doctors who have made examinations for him relative
to the issue at trial gives rise to a presumption that the medical
testimony of those doctors not called would have been adverse
to this contention. This doctrine is applicable in workmen's
compensation 21 and personal injury cases.22 The fact that doc-
18. 39 So.2d 139 (La. App. 1949).
19. Morgan v. American Bitumuls Co., 39 So.2d 139, 144 (La. App. 1949).
20. Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act. LA. R.S. 23:1317 (1950) : "...
The court shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence, ... but all findings
of fact must be based on competent evidence."
21. Keener v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 96 So.2d 509 (La. App. 1957) ; Chance
v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 92 So.2d 493 (La. App. 1957); Walker
v. Monroe, 62 So.2d 676 (La. App. 1953); Rider v. R. P. Farnsworth Co., 61
So.2d 204 (La. App. 1952); Morgan v. American Bitumuls Co., 39 So.2d 139(La. App. 1949) ; Law v. K. C. Bridge Co., 199 So. 155 (La. App. 1940) ; Johnson
v. Damange-Godman Lbr. Co., 141 So. 779 (La. App. 1932); McPherson v.
Hillyer Deutsch-Edwards, Inc., 143 So. 89 (La. App. 1932).
22. Moore v. Natchitoches Coca Cola Bottling Co., 32 So.2d 347 (La. App.
1947) (alleged contaminated coke, did not call doctors to show illness) ;, Gunter
v. Alexandria Coca Cola Bottling Co., 197 So. 159 (La. App. 1940) (called one
doctor who testified adversely to plaintiff; failed to call second doctor) ; Hines
v. Heinkamp, 194 So. 731 (La. App. 1940) (had neighbors testify, but failed
to call doctor); Comforto v. Cloverland Dairy Products Co., 194 So. 43 (La.
App. 1940) (called no doctor to corroborate claims).
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tors who examined the party were not called to testify may be
brought to the attention of the trier of fact and commented upon
by counsel in argument. Thus, it may be seen that often the
detrimental effect of the presumption on a plaintiff's claim may
outweigh any disadvantage that would result from putting the
doctor on the stand. The net effect of the presumption is to allow
the court to draw inferences from a visit made to a physician
which might not have been possible if a privilege were present.
In the materials covered so far there would appear to be
little authority for the proposition that the physician-patient
privilege exists in civil cases. It was pointed out that Louisiana
derived no civil privilege by reason of its adoption of the com-
mon law rules of evidence. The Louisiana Constitution has pro-
vided the basis for such a privilege, but none has ever been ex-
pressly enacted. Although there exists basis for argument, it is
doubtful that the Code of Criminal Procedure privilege is ap-
plicable in civil cases. There is no privilege in workmen's com-
pensation cases, and it is likely that none exists in personal in-
jury cases. However, a recent decision of the Louisiana Supreme
Court seems to throw the entire matter into uncertainty. In
Savin v. Savin,28 a husband sought a divorce from his wife on
the grounds of adultery. In an effort to show that she was preg-
nant, he attempted to call her doctor to testify as to a medical
examination the doctor had made. Defendant objected, saying
that the results of the examination were part of a privileged
communication between herself and the doctor. The objection
was sustained by the district court and this position was af-
firmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
quoted with approval from the opinion of the trial judge:
"Plaintiff's next charge against the defendant is that she
is pregnant. This, of course, would show that she is guilty
of committing adultery, for she has lived continuously apart
from her husband for a period of over three and one-half
years.
"For the purpose of establishing this fact, plaintiff at-
tempted to produce the evidence of a physician, Dr. Lopez,
and also questioned one or two of his lady witnesses regard-
ing their visual observations of defendant's physical appear-
ance.
23. 218 La. 754, 51 So.2d 41 (1951).
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"Dr. Lopez was not permitted to testify. Defendant ap-
parently consulted him for medical advice or treatment, and
her husband found out about it. But on trial of the case,
when the doctor was presented as a witness by the plaintiff,
defendant refused to waive her legal right not to have the
doctor disclose the nature of her visit and the result of his
examination, if he made one." (Emphasis added.)24
Thus, the Supreme Court seems to have recognized the physi-
cian-patient privilege for the first time in a civil case in Lou-
isiana. The exact basis for such recognition does not appear in
the case, and no authority has been found for such a decision
in the existing legislation and jurisprudence. It appears from
this decision that the court will not require any legislative basis
for the privilege. If so, the court will perhaps turn to the pro-
visions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a possible guide
in the application of the physician-patient privilege in civil cases.
Policy Considerations
The considerations involved in determining whether or not
the privilege should be a part of the law of evidence is largely
a balancing process. The suppression of relevant evidence is to
be balanced against the unhindered disclosure of information
between doctors and their patients. In the opinion of the writer
utilization of the privilege in the Savin case clearly points up an
injustice in any application of the privilege. If the wife was
not pregnant, she had nothing to fear in allowing her doctor
to testify. If she was pregnant, and therefore perhaps an adult-
eress, then this fact was kept from the court and consequently
an injustice resulted, as the divorce was denied.
Until subsequent cases or legislation appear, there is marked
uncertainty as regards the physician-patient privilege in Louisi-
ana civil cases. In favor of the privilege is the desirability of
protecting the relationship between the physician and his pa-
tients. There is also the Hippocratic Oath, which says: "What-
soever things I see or hear concerning the life of men, in my
attendance on the sick or even part therefrom, which ought not
to be noised abroad, I will keep silence thereon, counting such
things to be as sacred secrets." On the other hand, exercise of
the privilege might often lead to the suppression of very rele-
vant evidence, as in the Savin case. It is submitted that non-
24. Savin v. Savin, 218 La. 754, 762, 51 So.2d 41, 44 (1951).
[Vol. XX
1960] COMMENTS 425
existence of the privilege is not likely to cause any person in
need of medical aid to forego such treatment because of possible
disclosure in a court of law at a future date. In the opinion of
the writer, the physician-patient privilege is unwarranted in
Louisiana civil cases, and its presence would pose a threat to the
administration of justice.
Leslie J. Schiff
